> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://docs.efento.io/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://docs.efento.io/nb-iot-loggers/operation/security.md).

# Security

## **Secure data transmission**

Data transmission in the cellular network is encrypted by the network operator. The data security problem appears at the stage of data transfer via the Internet – between the cellular network and Efento Cloud / the customer's server. Efento loggers send data using the CoAP protocol over UDP, which is designed to be lightweight. Adding encryption increases the size of the sent messages, and thus the device's battery consumption. The solution that ensures safe data transmission from the logger to the server is the use of an APN configured by the network operator and a secure tunnel (VPN) configuration between the APN and Efento Cloud / the customer's server. The data is then still sent using the lightweight CoAP/UDP protocol, without increasing energy consumption, and thanks to the tunnel, it cannot be eavesdropped on during its transmission over the public Internet.

## **Message authentication and integrity**

Each Efento logger is provided with a unique pair of cryptographic keys during production. The logger digitally signs each message with its private key (ECDSA), and the server verifies the signature with the logger's public key. This ensures that the data received by the server comes from a specific Efento logger and has not been modified during transmission. The private key is stored securely in the logger and cannot be read or changed. The public key can be read via Bluetooth or is provided by Efento in the production files delivered with the devices.

## **Bluetooth security**

### **PIN code**

Changing logger settings over Bluetooth also requires entering the device PIN code. The PIN is printed only on the physical label of the logger, so a person without physical access to the device cannot change its configuration locally over Bluetooth. After the correct PIN has been entered for a particular logger on a given mobile device, the application remembers it and it does not need to be entered again for subsequent connections from that device.

### **Encryption**

Wireless communication via the Bluetooth Low Energy interface can be encrypted. If the encryption is turned on, then mobile devices that do not have an encryption key compatible with the key, with which the communication is encrypted cannot read any data sent by the logger. For detailed configuration instructions, see the dedicated sections for [**Encryption**](/nb-iot-loggers/configuration/device-settings/encryption.md).

### **Bluetooth turn-off time**

Additionally, it is possible to automatically turn off the Bluetooth Low Energy interface after the desired time from starting the logger. Thanks to this, it will not be possible to connect to the logger using devices equipped with the Bluetooth Low Energy interface. For detailed configuration instructions, see the dedicated sections for [**Bluetooth turn-off time**](/nb-iot-loggers/configuration/device-settings/bluetooth-turn-off-time.md)**.**

## **Tamper alert** <a href="#tamper-alerts" id="tamper-alerts"></a>

### **Overview** <a href="#overview" id="overview"></a>

Efento loggers include built-in anti-tamper mechanisms designed to detect and report unauthorized physical interference as well as local digital attacks. In regulated environments such as healthcare, pharmaceuticals, food storage, and cold-chain logistics, tamper detection ensures that any attempt to manipulate the hardware, disconnect power, or alter logger settings is immediately recorded and reported.

Tamper protection operates on two distinct levels:

1. **Enclosure Tamper Alert** – physical detection of opening the logger casing.
2. **PIN Tamper Alert** – protection against Bluetooth PIN brute-force attacks.

### **Enclosure tamper alert (physical protection)** <a href="#id-1.-enclosure-tamper-alert-physical-protection" id="id-1.-enclosure-tamper-alert-physical-protection"></a>

The logger contains an internal tamper switch that detects whenever the enclosure cover is removed or reattached.

#### **How it works** <a href="#how-it-works" id="how-it-works"></a>

* **Immediate cellular transmission:** Opening or closing the casing immediately wakes the cellular modem and triggers an urgent transmission to the server, regardless of the regular transmission interval.
* **Persistent evidence:** The logger maintains state history. Even if an unauthorized person opens the casing and immediately closes it back up, the incident cannot be hidden.

The alert remains latched until the event is confirmed. It returns to the normal state only after the server acknowledges receipt of the tamper notification during communication.

### **PIN tamper alert (Bluetooth brute-force protection)** <a href="#id-2.-pin-tamper-alert-bluetooth-brute-force-protection" id="id-2.-pin-tamper-alert-bluetooth-brute-force-protection"></a>

To prevent unauthorized users from guessing the device PIN over Bluetooth and altering critical settings (such as alarm thresholds or server endpoints), the logger monitors consecutive failed authentication attempts.

#### **How it works?** <a href="#how-it-works.1" id="how-it-works.1"></a>

* **Activation threshold:** The mechanism activates after **3 consecutive incorrect PIN attempts** over Bluetooth.
* **Emergency alert to the server:** Starting from the 3rd failed attempt, every subsequent invalid PIN triggers an immediate cellular transmission to notify the server that someone is attempting unauthorized local access.
* **Progressive Bluetooth lockout:** The logger temporarily blocks all incoming Bluetooth configuration commands. The lockout duration doubles with each subsequent failed attempt:

| Failed Attempt     | Lockout Duration |
| ------------------ | ---------------- |
| 1st – 2nd          | None             |
| 3rd                | 1 minute         |
| 4th                | 2 minutes        |
| 5th                | 4 minutes        |
| 6th                | 8 minutes        |
| 7th                | 16 minutes       |
| 8th                | 32 minutes       |
| 9th and subsequent | 60 minutes       |

#### **Resetting the counter** <a href="#resetting-the-counter" id="resetting-the-counter"></a>

Entering the **correct PIN** immediately clears the failed attempt counter and restores full Bluetooth access.


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